Generational Dynamics: Forecasting America's Destiny Generational
Dynamics
 Forecasting America's Destiny ... and the World's

 |  HOME  |  WEB LOG  |  COUNTRY WIKI  |  COMMENT  |  FORUM  |  DOWNLOADS  |  ABOUT  | 

Generational Dynamics Web Log for 26-Jan-07
Three killed in student riots at Beirut Lebanon's Arab University

Web Log - January, 2007

Three killed in student riots at Beirut Lebanon's Arab University

However, there are signs of diminishing violence in both Lebanon and Iraq.

At least two students are dead and 30 injured in street battles at the Beirut Arab University on Thursday, resulting in army intervention.


Street battles at Beirut Arab University <font face=Arial size=-2>(Source: CNN)</font>
Street battles at Beirut Arab University (Source: CNN)

The mainstream media have been continuing their incessant talk of impending civil war even though, as regular readers of this web site know, Lebanon is in a generational Awakening era, since only one generation has passed since the crisis civil war of the 1980s, and a new crisis civil war is impossible in a generational Awakening era.

One can see this generational concept in action today in Lebanon. The amount of horror and concern over the possibility of a new civil war is palpable, so much so that it serves to inhibit anything resembling a new civil war.

For example, one pro-government official said: "I hope that the memory of the Lebanese civil war was still strong enough in the memory of most to deter them from repeating the same mistake."

Strangely, the memory of the 1980s civil war has been the greatest factor in the public attitude toward Hizbollah chief Sheik Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.


Hizbollah chief Sheik Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on Lebanese television Thursday, telling his supporters to stop fighting and go home. <font face=Arial size=-2>(Source: CNN)</font>
Hizbollah chief Sheik Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on Lebanese television Thursday, telling his supporters to stop fighting and go home. (Source: CNN)

Many Lebanese were actually opposed to the summer war when it was actually on, but they sided with Nasrallah and Hizbollah because it was considered of utmost important that the Lebanese people be unified, in contrast to what happened in the 1980s. Many people would have liked to complain, especially since their entire country was being torn up, but their sense of purpose in maintaining unity caused many people to support Hizbollah when they otherwise wouldn't have.

But now, six months later, things have changed. Recently, Nasrallah has been directing his fury not at Israel, but at the Lebanese government, insisting that he be given veto power over lawmaking. He called massive demonstrations and riots, and they just kept on without much happening.

Then on Tuesday he held the nation wide strike that shut down the country, and this was too much for many in the public. It was one thing to support Nasrallah when he was fighting Israel, but there's no patriotic duty at all to support Nasrallah when he's fighting the Lebanese government.

Media reports from Lebanon on Wednesday and Thursday have been filled with people expressing loss of confidence in Nasrallah, most significantly from his formerly devoted Shiite supported.

In one report, a Lebanese woman says, "I was a supporter. Before, (Hezbollah leaders) acted in a more transparent way. But I am very much against what they did yesterday destroying roads, traffic lights and everything else."

Another former supported said his sympathy for Nasrallah "died yesterday. They take advantage of our religious loyalties but turn the streets into military zones."

MEMRI translated a a series of interviews appearing on Lebanese TV.

One woman said, "They said they would take to the streets in a civilized and peaceful manner. It has become evident just how civilized and peaceful they are in their attack against us and against our children, in their beating and killing them. Never mind, all we hope is for that hole-dweller, that 'Abu Lahb' ... We hope that this mouse will come out of his hole. Then we will show him what he's worth. That's it."

Another said, "I want to tell him that we won't let anyone turn this place into a second Israel-Palestine with stones, and with all the war fatwas he issues all the time. He says he wants national unity, but this is not national unity. He got it wrong."

Another summed it up by saying, "Nasrallah, are you happy now? You've driven the Lebanese to fight one another. Are you happy now, Nasrallah?"

What you're seeing here is Generational Dynamics theory in action. People frequently ask me, how can you be so certain that there won't be a civil war in Iraq (as I've been saying since 2003) and Lebanon? The theoretical answer is that you can't have a crisis civil war in an Awakening era. But for a "street answer," just look at what's happening.

You have college students rioting and fighting at Beirut Arab University. College students rioting is a standard fixture of Awakening eras, as anyone knows who remembers what happened during the 1960s, America's last generational Awakening era.

The reason that there are always college students rioting during Awakening eras is because they're in the first generation born after the previous crisis war, so they have no personal memory of its horrors. And so, being young, they fight with each other and with their parents. (Later, they grow up into a generation like our Boomers, who still fight with each other and never do anything else.)

But during an awakening era, you can see from the above quotes how greatly their parents and their leaders pressure them to stop fighting. People in the older generations typically are so traumatized from the crisis war that they've vowed that their children and grandchildren will never have to go through anything like it.

Now we're finally beginning to see that kind of pressure being applied in Iraq. It's been a long time coming, but an analysis by Hudson Institute fellow Nibras Kazimi, says that "al Qaeda is about to run out of steam" in Iraq:

"What needs to be understood is the central role that Al Qaeda or more accurately its successor organization, a group called the Islamic State of Iraq is playing on these fronts and the diminishing role of all the other insurgent groups.

The wider Sunni insurgency the groups beyond Al Qaeda is being slowly, and surely, defeated. The average insurgent today feels demoralized, disillusioned, and hunted. Those who have not been captured yet are opting for a quieter life outside of Iraq. Al Qaeda continues to grow for the time being as it cannibalizes the other insurgent groups and absorbs their most radical and hardcore fringes into its fold. The Baathists, who had been critical in spurring the initial insurgency, are becoming less and less relevant, and are drifting without a clear purpose following the hanging of their idol, Saddam Hussein. Rounding out this changing landscape is that Al Qaeda itself is getting a serious beating as the Americans improve in intelligence gathering and partner with more reliable Iraqi forces.

In other words, battling the insurgency now essentially means battling Al Qaeda. This is a major accomplishment."

Other reports have indicated that al-Qaeda has been forced to import many jihadists from other countries, mostly from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, because native Iraqis were unwilling to fight unless they were paid to do so, and were unwilling to risk death. In particular, almost all suicide bombers have been imported; almost none have been Iraqis. This is typical behavior for people in a country in an Awakening era.

So Kazimi's analysis makes it clear that al-Qaeda hasn't gotten a break in Iraq. They've had lukewarm support from Iraqi Sunnis, and they've had to face American weapons. Not a pleasant environment.

The insurgency was actually beginning to diminish at the end of 2005, but grew again after Sunni groups bombed the Shiite al-Askariya shrine in Samarra in February, 2006. This inflamed the Shiites, who had previously been restrained, to the extent that they began launching death squads against the Sunni jihadists.

Now, ten months later, Kazimi describes the result:

"Sadly, it took many thousands of young Sunnis getting abducted by death squads for the Sunnis to understand that in a full-fledged civil war, they would likely lose badly and be evicted from Baghdad. I believe that the Sunnis and insurgents are now war weary, and that this is a turnaround point in the campaign to stabilize Iraq."

Of course, not all of the Mideast is in a generational Awakening era. In particular, Saudi Arabia is deeply into a crisis era, and Palestine is also in a generational Crisis era.

And there's no pulling away from war there. The Israeli people are anxious and frightened, and are willing to go to war at the slightest provocation, as happened last summer in the war with Hizbollah, when Israel panicked and rushed to war in four hours, with no plan and no clear objective. That's how countries in generational Crisis eras act.

And there's no pulling away from war for the young Palestinians in the terrorities, especially in Gaza where the median age is 15.8, making Gaza a densely packed region that's run by children with guns and missiles.

In 2003, I predicted that the Palestine region would descend into chaos and finally war, once Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon are out of the picture, and I predicted that there would be no major civil war or uprising in Iraq unless it became a theatre of war by outside forces, especially Palestinian and "mujahadeen" terrorists moving into Iraq to fight the war.

Those were my predictions in 2003, and they've come true as predicted. I don't see how those predictions could have been any better, given the available knowledge at the time. I've gotten one prediction after another completely correct, unlike ordinary "experts" whose predictions are no better than throwing a dart. I've repeatedly challenged anyone to find any web site in the world with a prediction record that comes even close to mine, and no one has.

Generational Dynamics thus gives a very accurate country-by-country picture of what's happening and what's going to happen in the Mideast and any other regions of the world.

The traffic to this web site has been growing steadily since I put it up in 2002. There are now over 500 unique visitors per day (not including search engines), which probably equates to 2-3000 regular or occasional visitors.

But it frustrates me to have so many web site readers, and still not be able to attract the attention of the people in the State Dept. or the Dept. of Defense, especially when I know that this material and this methodology would be extremely valuable to our government.

So I'm asking my readers: If you are from the Federal government, or if you know somebody who is, please contact me and give me an opportunity to make this material available where it can do a lot of good. (26-Jan-07) Permanent Link
Receive daily World View columns by e-mail
Donate to Generational Dynamics via PayPal

Web Log Pages

Current Web Log

Web Log Summary - 2016
Web Log Summary - 2015
Web Log Summary - 2014
Web Log Summary - 2013
Web Log Summary - 2012
Web Log Summary - 2011
Web Log Summary - 2010
Web Log Summary - 2009
Web Log Summary - 2008
Web Log Summary - 2007
Web Log Summary - 2006
Web Log Summary - 2005
Web Log Summary - 2004

Web Log - December, 2016
Web Log - November, 2016
Web Log - October, 2016
Web Log - September, 2016
Web Log - August, 2016
Web Log - July, 2016
Web Log - June, 2016
Web Log - May, 2016
Web Log - April, 2016
Web Log - March, 2016
Web Log - February, 2016
Web Log - January, 2016
Web Log - December, 2015
Web Log - November, 2015
Web Log - October, 2015
Web Log - September, 2015
Web Log - August, 2015
Web Log - July, 2015
Web Log - June, 2015
Web Log - May, 2015
Web Log - April, 2015
Web Log - March, 2015
Web Log - February, 2015
Web Log - January, 2015
Web Log - December, 2014
Web Log - November, 2014
Web Log - October, 2014
Web Log - September, 2014
Web Log - August, 2014
Web Log - July, 2014
Web Log - June, 2014
Web Log - May, 2014
Web Log - April, 2014
Web Log - March, 2014
Web Log - February, 2014
Web Log - January, 2014
Web Log - December, 2013
Web Log - November, 2013
Web Log - October, 2013
Web Log - September, 2013
Web Log - August, 2013
Web Log - July, 2013
Web Log - June, 2013
Web Log - May, 2013
Web Log - April, 2013
Web Log - March, 2013
Web Log - February, 2013
Web Log - January, 2013
Web Log - December, 2012
Web Log - November, 2012
Web Log - October, 2012
Web Log - September, 2012
Web Log - August, 2012
Web Log - July, 2012
Web Log - June, 2012
Web Log - May, 2012
Web Log - April, 2012
Web Log - March, 2012
Web Log - February, 2012
Web Log - January, 2012
Web Log - December, 2011
Web Log - November, 2011
Web Log - October, 2011
Web Log - September, 2011
Web Log - August, 2011
Web Log - July, 2011
Web Log - June, 2011
Web Log - May, 2011
Web Log - April, 2011
Web Log - March, 2011
Web Log - February, 2011
Web Log - January, 2011
Web Log - December, 2010
Web Log - November, 2010
Web Log - October, 2010
Web Log - September, 2010
Web Log - August, 2010
Web Log - July, 2010
Web Log - June, 2010
Web Log - May, 2010
Web Log - April, 2010
Web Log - March, 2010
Web Log - February, 2010
Web Log - January, 2010
Web Log - December, 2009
Web Log - November, 2009
Web Log - October, 2009
Web Log - September, 2009
Web Log - August, 2009
Web Log - July, 2009
Web Log - June, 2009
Web Log - May, 2009
Web Log - April, 2009
Web Log - March, 2009
Web Log - February, 2009
Web Log - January, 2009
Web Log - December, 2008
Web Log - November, 2008
Web Log - October, 2008
Web Log - September, 2008
Web Log - August, 2008
Web Log - July, 2008
Web Log - June, 2008
Web Log - May, 2008
Web Log - April, 2008
Web Log - March, 2008
Web Log - February, 2008
Web Log - January, 2008
Web Log - December, 2007
Web Log - November, 2007
Web Log - October, 2007
Web Log - September, 2007
Web Log - August, 2007
Web Log - July, 2007
Web Log - June, 2007
Web Log - May, 2007
Web Log - April, 2007
Web Log - March, 2007
Web Log - February, 2007
Web Log - January, 2007
Web Log - December, 2006
Web Log - November, 2006
Web Log - October, 2006
Web Log - September, 2006
Web Log - August, 2006
Web Log - July, 2006
Web Log - June, 2006
Web Log - May, 2006
Web Log - April, 2006
Web Log - March, 2006
Web Log - February, 2006
Web Log - January, 2006
Web Log - December, 2005
Web Log - November, 2005
Web Log - October, 2005
Web Log - September, 2005
Web Log - August, 2005
Web Log - July, 2005
Web Log - June, 2005
Web Log - May, 2005
Web Log - April, 2005
Web Log - March, 2005
Web Log - February, 2005
Web Log - January, 2005
Web Log - December, 2004
Web Log - November, 2004
Web Log - October, 2004
Web Log - September, 2004
Web Log - August, 2004
Web Log - July, 2004
Web Log - June, 2004


Copyright © 2002-2016 by John J. Xenakis.